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CONCEPTS AND POLICIES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY
By RALPH F. FUCHSt

I.

ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ix

RELATION

TO DEMOCRACY

MUCH WATER has run over the dam since, in the last decades of the

nineteenth century, Anglo-American legal writers began to concern
themselves with the previously undiscussed topic of administrative law.
Monographs, small treatises, and upward of 20,000 pages of periodical
literature have dealt with the subject, but the multiplication of administrative agencies of government, especially during and since the Great
War, has far outrun the ability of students and commentators to keep
up with it. Recurrent political movements for remedying by governmental action the evils of an industrial era have left deposits of regulatory and welfare legislation which have engendered opposition to growing public expenditures and to interference with private activity, particularly that of business enterprise. Stirred by such opposition or by
a concern for governmental efficiency in the face of a mounting administrative burden, public and private committees and commissions in both
England and the United States have investigated and reported upon
proposals for simplifying the official structure and improving the procedure of especially those agencies which deal with private persons and
property.
Modern life has, however, continued apace its headlong pursuit of
technological advance despite the increasing governmental problems which
are created by -it. At the same time the "world of man has largely ceased
to expand geographically; opportunity for all must now be carved out
at home. Basically, of course, the problems created by technology and
by the disappearance of frontiers are not legal and administrative but
economic and political.' They arise not only from the increased tempo
of life and an expanded population in a limited area, but still more from
the inadequacy of the prevailing institutions of management and control. The system of mass production, for example, as often has been
said, requires cooperation among large groups of producers and full partProfessor of Law, Washington University; Fellow, Columbia Univerty School of
Law, 1937-38.
1. It is recognized, of course, that the final problems in government as in other
fields of endeavor are philosophical, relating to the ultimate ends of life. But it is not

necessary to revert to the primary purpose of the state in a discussion which assumes

the democratic thesis and, hence, a common purpose that embraces the more limited
objectives to which reference is made. See
(1896) 89.

CfCKECHNIE, THE STATE AND THE INDIvIDvAL
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ticipation in its benefits by the mass of consumers; yet management is
still to a great extent in the hands of a limited number of property
owners, whom labor unions recurrently challenge. The system, too, is
obviously international; yet nationalist authorities exercise sovereign
control with an eye partly to war. Hence the difficulties to be solved
are not merely those of coordinating the participating elements in a
common life, but the far greater ones of bringing warring groups together and checking the power of vested interests that do not coincide
with the general interest.
Increased urgency in the problems to be met has naturally called forth
more drastic governmental measures for dealing with them. Dictatorships have arisen to challenge democracies as instruments for solving
these problems, and a burning issue in the so-called democratic nations
is whether this challenge can be met. Important in resolving that issue
is the sufficiency of the systems of administration which have been the
chief reliance of these nations for (1) achieviig justice in ordinary
human relations, (2) carrying on the growing volume of day-to-day
public services, (3) collecting taxes, and (4) adjusting those clashes of
group interest which have been engendered by maladjustment between
the scope of the problems to be met and the competence of the agencies
relied upon for dealing with them. The fourth of these tasks of administration may, if one likes, be viewed as temporary, until such time as
a better distribution of power is achieved. Even after that much-to-be
desired outcome has been attained, however, the need for public administration will be greater than it has been until recently, for the increased
magnitude and tempo of the activities produced by technological advance
will be relatively permanent. Those qualities of current democratic administration which are pertinent to democracy, therefore, will be important as long as the governments which are able to make use of them
endure, whether these governments be capitalist or socialist in nature;
and the deficiencies will be equally harmful to either type of organiiation.2
There is an important distinction between administration and administrative law. Administration embraces the entire conduct of governmental activity, aside from the actual formulation of fundamental policy.
It includes the application of law and the piecemeal determination of
policy through judicial decision, as well as the more ordinary activity
of the executive branch of the government and the routine operations
2. Cf. Sharfman, The Interstate Comerce Commission: an Appraisal (1937)
46 YALE L J. 915, at 954. It is true, of course, that the qualities of democratic adninistration which relate merely to efficiency will be of value to any type of government,
democrafic or other, which is in a position to make use of them. For the purposes of
this discussion, however, they are of importance only in so far as they coexist with
qualities which are democratic.
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of the other two branches. For historical reasons, however, the deciding
of cases by the courts has usually been excluded from the concept of
administration. In accordance with the above definition, moreover, a
distinction is drawn between executive action of major importance in
policy determination and the day-to-day activities of executive agencies,
which are spoken of as administration.'
In one sense the term administrative law embraces all the law that
controls, or is intended to control, the administrative operations of
government. It includes the law which provides the structure of
4
government and prescribes its procedure, but not the substantive law 6
which administration is supposed to apply, nor, of course, the policies
of executive and legislature in major matters of statecraft. It embraces
the law which governs the methods of legislatures, provides for the
existence and operation of the courts aside from their procedure in
the actual progress of litigation, establishes the executive agencies and
governs their procedure, and determines personnel policies in all branches
of the government. Lawyers' administrative law, however, is a considerably narrower concept. Roughly speaking, it embraces the law
which is pertinent to the bearing of administration upon private persons
and property. Because those aspects of government in which it bears
upon individuals and their property have always been of central significance in democratic theory, lawyers' administrative law is of crucial
importance in relation to the adaptation of democratic administration to
contemporary demands.
There is another and perhaps more fundamental side to democratic
theory - th affirmative side, which has to do with the representation
of 'individuals and interests in government and their participation in the
formulation of policy and with the effectuation of policies when arrived
at. The legal phases of this aspect of democracy, however, have not
been especially important, and, moreover, the problems which have arisen
in this field have not given rise on the whole to basic controversy. Since
3. The essay by Professor Fairlie, Origin and Meaning of Public Administration,
which opens the volume of EssAYs ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION IINMEmoRY oF FRANK J. GoonD~ow (1935), contains an excellent review of
the various conceptions of administration that have been entertained from time to time.
4. Viewed in this light, it embraces much of constitutional law. Berle, The
Expansion of American Administrative Law (1917) 30 HAxv. L. REv. 430. Conventionally, however, that portion of the law of administration which receives expression in constitutional provisions is segregated in a constitutional law which is thought
of as superior to the administrative law that ordinarily goes by that term.
5. It is not intended to insist that there is a hard-and-fast distinction between
procedural law and substantive law. Thus, the law of the valuation of public utilities
may be stated in part as the obligation of the regulating agency to take account of
specified data. But here, as in court-administered law, there is on the whole an obvious
difference between the rules goveriing notice, hearing, etc., in the proceedings of

administrative agencies and the content of the orders which issue from them.
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the removal of property qualifications for voting and the enfranchisement of women, the protection of the right of subject races, such as the
negroes, to participation in government has presented the principal difficulty in this connection. The issue of group representation in the legislature has not been pressed. Similar problems of representation arise in
industry; but when the democratization of the economic order is sought,
the government's relation to that effort raises questions of the bearing
of administration upon private persons and property, and, consequently,
the sphere of lawyers' administrative law is entered. Within the past
two years, however, proposals in this country for reorganizing the executive branch of the Federal Government have brought the affirmative
side of democratic theory to the fore, especially with regard to its implications and effects upon lawyers' administrative lawv.
The reasons for the importance of the bearing of government upon
private persons and property in Anglo-American democratic theory are
not far to seek. First is the fact that democratic government arose out
of protest against the oppressions and abuses of existing governments.
Hence the emphasis upon the security of private interests in the political
theory of John Locke6 and in the Bills of Rights. These, in part, gave

legal expression to the popular victories in the English and American
revolutions-for distrust of old governments did not easily give way to
confidence in the new.7 Secondly, the rise of democratic government
coincided with the increasing sway of the laissez-faire economic theory
that responded to the needs of a commercial age. Locke, Adam Smith,
Blackstone, Bentham, and Jefferson voiced the dominant political, economic, and legal theories of their time. The last four were contemporary
with each other and with the American Revolution, and laissezrfaire
was woven into the fabric of their thought.8 From their thinking derives
the Anglo-American norm of the "capitalist-constable" state.0
The theory of the separation of powers," 6 the specific provisions of
the English, Federal, and American state bills of rights, and the limitations which have been read into the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, " constitute the main body of legal doctrine expressing the keen distrust of political authority over private per6. Cf. Hamilton, Property-According to Loche (1932) 41 Y.u L. J. E54.
7. The story of the continued emphasis upon legal protection against the government in English history is well told in Dxciuxsorr, ADurXNImATn JusTica Aim THE
SU'RmaACY oF LAw (1927) c. 4.
8. Cf. WALLAS, TaE GxAT Soclnrn (1920) c. 7; Fuchs, Tito Ncwcr Social
Scientists Look at Law (1927) 13 S. Louis L Rsv. 33; Franklin, Administrative Law

in the United States (1934) 8 TULAN L. REv. 483.
9. Beard, Indiidualism and Capitalism (1930) 1 ENcyc. Soc. Sctmcns 145, 161.
10. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powcrs (1935)
2 U. oF CH. L REv. 385; Mum, How BmT'rA.. Is GovamnxD (1929) 18.
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sons and property that has accompanied the rise of Anglo-American
democracy. That distrust, it is true, has operated in the presence of
inherited from the absolute
conceded governmental power -power
monarchy in England and in the states, and power conferred by the
Constitution in the case of the Federal Government. But it is the limitations and not the power which, until now, have been the primary concern
of the courts, of perhaps most theorists, and of almost all legal writers
since 1776. "There is a type of social habit which abhors all official
intervention in private affairs," manifesting itself "in a constitution
of law and government which confines public functions as far as possible
to the exercise of judicial power." 1 2 Such has been the Anglo-American
habit as it has been reported in many a learned piece of writing.
In England the theory of the separation of powers has, of course,
been expressive of an ideal and has not been legally enforcible. As a
necessary democratic supplement to it in the presence of a hereditary
Crown, the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy has held sway since
the time of the Glorious Revolution."3 Directed mainly against the executive, its terms have not been altered in legal minds by the rise of
the Cabinet and the establishment of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. In the United States a theoretical equality in rank has continued
to prevail among the three departments of government.
Against this background, it is small cause for wonder that the enormous
expansion of governmental administration affecting private persons and
property should have created consternation in the legal world. The facts
regarding the expansion of administrative powers during the past fifty
years are too familiar to require presentation here.14 The net result is
11. MoTT, DUE PRocEss OF LAW (1926) Part V. Specific provisions of the main
body of the Federal Constitution, such as the contract clause, might also be mentioned.
They are, however, of less contemporary importance than those included in the text.
12. FREUND, THE GRowTH OF AmmIcAN ADMINiSTRATiVE LAW (1923) at 17.
13. 1 BL. Comm. *54, Rutlcdge, Legal Personality-Legislative or Judicial Prerogative (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. Rav. 343, at 367-369.
14. Good historical summaries of the English development will be found in Anderson,
Bureaucracy (1929) 7 J. Pun. ADM. 3; Mum, How BRITAIN Is GOVERNED (1929) 44-54;
Stamp, Recent Tendencies Towards the Devolution of Legislative Functions to the
Administration (1924) 2 J. PuB. ADMIN. 23; WrLas, THE PAIRLIAMENTARY POWERS
OF ENGLI9H GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933) 17-46. The statistics of delegated
rule-making in England are given in the testimony of Mr. Cecil T. Carr before the
Committee on Ministers' Powers [MiNums OF EviD. (1932) at 204]. For the United
States, descriptive sumtharies are contained in Bevis, Administrative Commssion, and
the Administration of Justice (1928) 2 U. OF CIN. L. Rav. 1; Shepherd, Legal Controls
through Administrdtive Law (1934) 14 ORE. L. Rav. 67; C. Pound, Constitutional
Aspects of American; Administrative Law, in THE GRowTr oF Amnuciu ADMINiSTRATIvE LAW (1923), reprinted in (1923) 9 A. B: A. J.409. For summaries which include
the New Deal developments see BLACHLY & OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LrIsLATox
AND ADjUDICATION (1934); American Bar Association, Report of the Special Com-
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that numerous public officials"5 exercise licensing, rule-making, and deciding powers over many forms of private activity and minister to some
of the most fundamental needs of the entire population, such as eduation, health, and old-age security. Although most of these officials are
in the executive branch of the government, many of their functions are
indistinguishable in nature from those performed by the legislature and
by the courts. The controls over the acts of the administration, moreover, exercised by the legislature, by the courts, and by the people
themselves, are remote and partial in their operation. Either democracy
has been seriously impaired by the change that has taken place, or else
the traditional theories of limitation of governmental power in a
democracy are in need of material revision.
II.

CONCEPTS AND POLICIES IN

CONTEMPORARY

THEORY

The development of administrative power over private persons and
property was generally ignored in Anglo-American legal thought until
after it had become an outstanding phenomenon.' 0 Its classic initial
recognition in England' 7 consisted of a denial that anything had changed
so far as the legal protection of individual rights was concerned,", an
opinion which still has its echo in some of the literature,
Such obscurantism, however, has now largely disappeared. Both the desirability
of the growth of official power and the proper scope of judicial control
over administrative action are subjects of acute controversy.
The thinking on these issues may be said to fall into the twofold
classification of conceptual and functional."' According to the conceptual
mittee on Administrative Law (1936) 61 A. B. A. Rep. 720. FREUND, AD

ucsIrSAIVE

PowERs ovER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) contains a thorough analysis of the administrative powers which had been conferred prior to the author's study in England,
pre-vmar Prussia, New York, and the Federal system.
15.

STATISTCAL ABSTRAcT Or THE UNITED STATES

(1936)

contains statistics of

the personnel of the Federal Government and of the proportion of the national income
expended by Federal, state, and local governments in the United States.
16. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. or PA. L Ray. 614.
17. Fairlie, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15-21, recites earlier instances of the recognition
of administration as a branch of jurisprudence. Bentham probably is the intellectual
founder of the mode-n British departmental system and of the science of administration.
Wallas, Jeremy Bentham (1930) 2 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 518.
18. DicEY, THE LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION (1885) 177-181. "In England, and
in countries which, like the United States, derive their civilization from English sources,
the system of administrative law and the very principles upon which it rests are in
truth unknown!' Id., at 180.
19. Writers cited in RoasoN, JUsTIcE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LiW (1928) at 30.
20. Willis, Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual,
and the Ftctional (1935) 1 U. oF Toao-to L. J. 53. Willis' "judicial" approach is
simply that of the judges, motivated by unwillingness to give free scope to the rival
administrative power.
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view, the object to be sought is conformity of the methods of administration and their control to assumed ideas about governmental power.
In this view, among lawyers, the separation of powers and the supremacy
of Parliament, together with the prohibitory constitutional limitations,
should be preserved without more than minor modification.2" Among
political scientists certain norms of governmental organization, supposedly relating to efficiency, are similarly stressed. The functional
school of thought envisages as the all-important consideration the adjustment of the machinery of government to the ends which need to be
served. From this point of view the question of the proper governmental
agency to exercise a given function and of the most desirable form of
administrative organization should be answered in terms of the concrete
results to be attained-results in both the furtherance of current legislative policy and the protection of private interest.2 2 Functional thinking,
of course, does not entirely ignore established categories, but it attaches
no weight to their observance in the allocation of governmental functions.
The Role of Discretion in Administration
Among the questions which have arisen in regard to administrative
power over persons and property is that of the degree of discretion which
it may involve. One of the most significant theoretical aspects of the
action of legislatures is the legally unfettered choice of values, or of
23 In this
ends, which characterizes it.
country, it is true, the choices of
even the legislature are subject to constitutional limitations, but these,
despite their present scope and serious import, operate by way of exception to an otherwise free determination of the policy of statutes. 24
The execution of statutory policies may or may not require the exercise of further value choices. The determination of facts and the application of the law to them in such situations as tax assessments, the
making of compensation awards, and non-discretionary licensing, does
21. "With the practical results of the different position assigned to officials under
French and under English law and with the merits or demerits of either system we
need not greatly concern ourselves; the one point which should be impressed upon
every student is that the droit administratif of France rests upon political principles at
variance with the ideas which are embodied in our existing constitution and contradicts
modem English convictions as to the rightful supremacy or rule of the law vf the land."
DIcEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1885) 203.
22. "Law is a matter. of business; means and ends are the things to be considered
in it, not abstractions." MILL, Essay on Benthain in 1 ESSAYS (1865) 397. See
MCKECHNiE, op. cit. stipra note 1, at 111, 168; WILLIS, supra note 20, at 75.
23. FREUND, STANDARDS OF Am,..ucAN LEGISLATION (1917) 215-217.
24. Whether in fact the ultimate determination of policy under statutes is by
the bodies which apply the statutes rather than by the legislature is a point which
does not require consideration here.

19381

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY

not involve such choices.25 The determination of reasonable utility rates,
of fitness to pursue an occupation, and of the requirements of public
convenience and necessity, on the other hand, does, for the ends to be
attained are not fixed and the administrative agencies must make a choice
among alternatives. In many situations administration performs a third
function. The end is definitely specified, but the measures required to
attain it must be gauged by expert judgment. The purchasing power of
the income of farmers is to be raised, let us say, to a statistically ascertainable level by means of a system of controlled production, benefit
payments, and taxes. Only the expert (if he) can estimate the probable
results of the alternative devices and combinations of devices that may
be employed to achieve such an end.
Which of these administrative functions should receive the name of
discretion is a matter of words. Since the word "discretion" is variously
used, it is important to recognize the types of determinations which
modern government requires of administrative officers and the sense in
which the term is used in particular contexts. Ordinarily it is employed
loosely to designate functions of the second and third types just mentioned.
Administrative discretion is exercised in connection with two classes
of administrative acts: the laying down of general rules to govern future
conduct, analogous to the rules contained in most acts of the legislature;
and the making of orders or decisions in particular cases, such as orders
for the abatement of nuisances or the granting or refusal of licenses.
To distinguish in borderline instances, such as rate-fixing orders, between
general rules and orders of specific application is a matter of some difficulty, if not an impossibility."0 The mental processes may be the same,
moreover, in the formulation of the two types of governmental regulation.2 7 But, on the whole, the classification of regulations into general
rules and orders in particular cases is sufficiently clear. These categories,
25. The oft-repeated statement that all administrative action involves some exercise
of discretion is highly questionable. Thus, it is not true that the policeman in making
arrests and the marriage license clerk in issuing licenses exercise discretion because
from time to time they have difficult fact determinations to make. Their work involves

the exercise of discrimination but not the estimation of probable consequences of a
course of action or the choice of policies. If they vaive the requirements of law in
particular cases, they do so in the absence of legally-conferred discretion.
26. AusTxx, JURISPRUDENCE (1861) 10-15; Fairlie, The Separation of Powers
(1923) 21 Mica. L. Rxv. 393, at 424; Alzin, The Concept of Legislation (1936) 21
Iow-A L. Rv. 713; O'Reilly, The Federal Administratie Court Proposal: An Examination of General Principles (1937) 6 FonrDAm. L. REv. 365, at 371; Diciuwson,
op. cit. stpra note 7, at 17-21; FREUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15; Cooper, Administrative Justice ad the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YA.rn L. J. 577, 584.
27. Green, Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YALEt L. J. 369.
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in other words, are useful for dealing with the phenomena involved.
They are also traditional and will be accepted here.28
In respect to the administrative formulation of general rules the issue
of how much discretion may be conferred arises in the guise of a
challenge to the delegation of legislative power. Although the same
issue affects the vesting of administrative power to decide particular
cases,2 9 the legal issues more commonly raised in regard to the latter
power are, first, whether judicial functions have been conferred unconstitutionally and, second, how far administrative decisions should be
subjected to judicial review. Regardless of these several issues, there has
emerged a fairly definite realization that where discretionary functions
are vested in administrative agencies the discretion is the essence of the
administrative process, and its exercise should not be disturbed."0 Dean
Pound -although not without occasional dissent from his own views probably has emphasized this idea more than any other writer." His
work is especially valuable because it has related discretionary administrative powers to developments within the judicial field itself, such as
the rise of juvenile courts. Both are largely the products of the increase
in problems of a complex and technical nature, the solution of which
requires the intuitive judgments of qualified officers, whose mental operations cannot be reduced to rules.8 2
28. Cf. WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 49.
29. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608 (1937); Bourlols,
Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937); (1927) 15 CALIF. L. Rzv. 408; Comment (1915)
15 CoL L. Rav. 63; Comment (1929) 43 HARV. L. Ray. 302; (1936) 34 MICH. L. REV.
572; Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power- Administrative Orders and
Executions (1911) 24 HARv. L. Ray. 333; Sigler, The Problem of Apparently Unguided
Administrative Discretion (1934) 19 ST. Louis L. REV. 261.
30. DICKINSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 36; Laski, The Growth of Administrative
Discretion (1923) 1 3. PUB. ADMIN. 92; Gordon, Administrative Tribunals and the
Courts (1933) 49 L. Q. REv. 94; Sharfman, op. cit. supra note 2, at 950 ("Perhaps
the Commission's most distinctive characteristic as a tribunal lies in the extensive
grants of discretionary power with which it is clothed in connection with all aspects
of its labors.") See also, Cooper, supra note 26, at 593 et scq.
31. The Administrative Application of Legal Standards (1919) 44 A. B. A. REP.
445; INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) c. 3. Some of Dean Pound's
other writings reflect his more conservative mood. See Executive Justice (1907)
55 Amr. L. REG. 137; Executive Justice (1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 12; The Costiltution:
Its Development, Adaptability, and Future (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 739.
32. From this point of view the late Ernst Freund, one of the great pioneer students
of administrative law, was on the whole a dissenter. Op. cit. supra note 14, at 97-102.
"A comprehensive view of administrative discretion discloses a tendency toward
standardization with a small residual margin for flexibility which approximates the
inevitable question of fact. The function of discretion would then be not to displace
rule but to prepare the way for it. On any other terms administrative discretion would
be an anomaly. It would mean thAt administrative authorities are superior to courts
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The Fate of the Separation of Powers
a. The Propriety of Administrative Rule-Making. Constitutional decisions in the United States have made it somewhat difficult for legislation to confer upon administrative authorities the power to lay down
discretionary general rules. But not all types of administrative rules are
affected by these decisions. There are numerous general regulations,
such as those governing the personnel policies of government, altering the
administrative .rganization, or .allocating expenditures, which do not
bear upon private interests and ordinarily are not called into question in
court.' * There are others, such as those governing the methods of taxing
authorities and service agencies of the government in dealing with the
public, which do affect private interests but not with sufficient directness
to give rise to constitutional issues. Still others, interpretative of statutory provisions which would be unadministerable without them, are of
undoubted constitutionality.3 4 Difficulty is created by regulations directly
governing private activity and enforcible by criminal sanctions or by

other means of compulsion. The Supreme Court has included in this
class the instances in which Congress has vested authority in the President to ascertain facts upon whose existence the entry of specified rules
into operation has been made to depend.3" The vesting of either type
in their capacity to deal with private rights, or that under modem conditions the public
welfare demands personal government instead of government by law." Id., at 102.
Freund's writings do not disclose any other basis than a conceptual one for combatting
the view that administrative authorities may be superior to courts for some purposes,
or that personal government may under some circumstances be a good thing. See also
The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law (1915) 9 Au. Por.. Scr. Rnv.
666; Administrative Discretion: A Reply to Dean Wigmore (1925) 19 ILL_ L. 1Rnv. 663.
In dealing with specific situations Freund at times was a 'defender against judicial
impairment of difficult administrative fact determinations, if not of administrative discretion. The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controveriies (1921) 27 NV. VA.

L Q. 207.
33. In the states, it is true, litigation over public expenditures sometimes turns upon
the validity of administrative power to fix their amount or determine their use. State
v. Smith, 329 Mo. 1019, 49 S. NV. (2d) 74 (1932); Tillotson v. Frohrniller, 271 Pac.
867 (Ariz., 1928). Recently, also, the power of the President to allocate funds under
some of the New Deal acts has been called in question. Comment (1937) 50 HAnv.

L REv. 802.
34. The correctness of the interpretations embodied in them is subject to judicial
check, but deference is paid to the administrative construction which they express.
Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U. S. 479 (1919); Lynch v. Tilden
Co., 265 U. S. 315 (1924); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375 (1931).
See also Morriisey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1935) 296 U. S. 344.
35. The various types of rule-making power are discussed in the opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1934). The
power to find facts in order to determine whether certain rules shall come into effect
is properly considered along with the power to prescribe regulations, because fre-
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of power may, if judicial criteria of validity are not adhered to, be
declared unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power.
In England the bestowal of "legislative" powers upon executive departments had been a subject of discussion for some years before it was
made one of the two problems that the Committee on Ministers' Powers,
in 1930, )vas created to consider."0 An excellent earlier study of the
subject 7 had pointed out the needs which under modern conditions have
given rise to the practice of delegating rule-making power. These are:
(1) the requirement of greater flexibility in the detail; of a law than
the legislature can supply, in order to meet changing c6nditions; (2)
the need for freeing the legislature from concern with details in the
initial consideration of a law, because of the pressure of time upon it
and the desirability of careful consideration of the fundamental problems involved; (3) the desirability of expert determination of numerous
matters involved in modern legislative schemes such as those affecting
housing, health, social security, and public services of many sorts; and
(4) the necessity of administrative authority to deal with emergencies,
for which the legislature often cannot be summoned and with which its
processes are too slow to deal, even when it is in session. 8 The Committee on Ministers' Powers followed the same views,3 9 taking care,
quently the facts to be found are of an indefinite variety [costs of production at home
and abroad under a flexible tariff act, as in the act considered in Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928); unfair practices by importers, calling for the
application of increased duties or of embargoes, as in the act involved in Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438 (1929)] and because in effect the President, to whom
such powers have usually been entrusted, cannot be made to move when lie deems
it undesirable to do so. GOODNOW, PRxN IPwEs OF THE ADMIN SRATxvE LAW OF THfl
UNITED STATES (1905) 91-94.
36. The Committee's "Terms of Reference" directed it "to consider the powers
exercised by or under the direction of (or by persons or bodies appointed by) Ministefo
of the Crown by way of (a) delegated legislation and (b) judicial or quasi-judicial
decision, and to report what safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the constitutional principle of the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the Law."
See REPORT (1932) at v.
37. CAR, DELEGATED LEGISLAIOsN (1921).
See also AMos, THE SCIENCE 0r
LAW (1894) at 399; ILBERT, MTHODs oF LEGIsLATroN (1912) at 146.
38. The same factors have been pointed out in subsequent writings. See, e.g.,
Stamp, op. cit. supra note 14, at 25. Stamp adds the necessity of local differentiation in
the administration of some statutes, which can be achieved by means of administrative
regulations, and the disastrous effects that would follow a resort to Parliament for
minor amendments to a controversial act, when the entire question of the merits of the
measure as a whole might be reopened. On the last point see Christie, The Legislature
and Administration (1930) 8 J. PuB. ADMIN. 367. See also, PORT, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (1929) at 137-145; KEITH, B iuTisH CoNsruioNA LAW (1931) at 84; 2 Ason,
LAW AND CusToM OF THE CONSTITUTION (4th ed. by Keith, 1935), at 249.
39. See REPORT (1932) at 5, 15-16, 22-23, 51-52.
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however, to point out that the justifications thus enumerated do not
extend to "abnormal" types of rule-making power, such as the power
to legislate in "matters of princip!e" and the power to impose taxes.4 0
The Committee recommended that delegation always be in clear language
setting precise limits and that "abnormal" delegation should not be resorted to except in unusual circumstances which the Committee specified. 4'
The distinction between rule-making in matters of principle and subordinate rule-making thus enunciated by the Committee on Ministers'
Powers is not dissimilar to the test of constitutionality adopted by the
Supreme Court in respect to the delegation of rule-making power by
Congress. The requirement that an enactment delegating such power
shall contain a "standard" to guide its exercise seems equivalent to a

requirement that the legislature itself determine matters of "principle,"
or fundamental policy. 42 But no satisfactory criterion of what constitutes
a sufficient standard has been developed.43 Only recently has it become
possible to assert that Congress must indicate both the permissible content
of the regulations and the occasions when they may be made." For

either purpose, however, the language employed may be so general as to
have the effect of leaving administrative discretion with implied rather
than expressed guides. 45 The chief consequence of statutory standards,
therefore, even when they have passed muster from the standpoint of
constitutionality, is to furnish an alleged test to be applied in the judicial
40. Id., at 30, 31.
41. Id., at 58-61. The Committee, taking note of considerations suggested by Sir
Maurice L. Gwyer, Treasury Solicitor, [MrNuTPs or Evmz.Ncu (1932) at 2] conceded
that even apart from "emergency" situations, rule-making power which is not in terms
limited to matters of detail may properly be conferred for the purpose of enabling a
government department to inaugurate a complicated scheme of administration such
as that necessitated by the National Insurance Act of 1911, 1 & 2 GEo. V, c. 55. It is
impossible for Parliament to anticipate many problems that Will arise under this kind
of measure or to adopt amending legislation when the need arises, especially where the
scheme is a controversial one. The Committee thought, however, that such power
should be limited to one year following the effective date of an act. For the use made
of such power under the National Insurance Act and two subsequent measures see
COMLUITTEE ON MINISTERS' Powns, ME-O
&oANDA By GoVEN .ENT DE A.m.-rs (1932)
31-33. Actually, the orders which were issued dealt only with details, but it would
have been impossible to anticipate what details would require treatment.
42. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YA=a L. J. 892, at
898.
43. Cousens, The Delegation of Federal Legislative Power to Executive Offlcials
(1935) 33 Mica. L. REv. 512.
44. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1934); Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U. S.495 (1936) ; Comment (1935) A8 H~nv. L REv. 809.
45. Cheadle, loc. cit. supra note 42; Cousens, loc. cit. supra note 43; New York
Central Securities Corp. v.United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1933).
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review 4" of rules that purport to follow their direct'ons. Without affording any effective safeguard against "legislative abdication," the application of the constitutional principle of non-delegation results principally
in an additional hazard to the validity of regulatory legislation that
confers rule-making powers.4 The seriousness of this hazard will be
proportional to the necessity for such legislation. If, as legislatures and
executives seem to believe and as many are willing to concede, that necessity is great, the success of democratic administration in coping with
modern problems is being jeopardized at a vital point. Skillful legislative
draftsmanship can minimize the difficulty,49 but it is at least arguable that
this aspect of the separation of powers"0 might better have been left in the
class of judicially unenforcible constitutional provisions. 1
It has been claimed, on the other hand, that broad executive rulemaking power, whether conferred by a constitution or by legislative delegation, facilitates the coming of fascism and that a judicial check upon

the practice is helpful.

2

Neither the predominant English view as ex-

pressed subsequently by the Committee on Ministers' Powers nor American constitutional doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court, however,
prevented virtually unlimited delegation in both countries during the
World War."' Inneither instance did permanent unbalance of the govern46. Frequently there is no available procedure for bringing about such review.
Moreover, the administrative proceedings, if any, which lead to the promulgation of
a general rule usually are not such as result in a record or reveal the precise basis
upon which the rule rests. Hence, unless it is clearly ultra vires, the likelihood of its
overturn by a court is not great. Black, Is the Test of Reasonableness of an Administrative Determination Subjective or Objective? (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ry,. 6b1.
The change, if any, which will result from the requirement of the Panama Refining
decision [293 U. S. 388 (1934)], that executive regulations be accompanied by "findings,"
has yet to be ascertained. Compare Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296
U. S. 176 (1935) ; Haines, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
816, at 835.
47. In England, perturbation over administrative rule-making has centered more
largely about the limitation of judicial review of the validity of departmental regulations than about the conference of the initial power to make them. See p. 559, infra.
48. That hazard seems particularly great in many of the states, where judicial
objection to regulatory legislation may be less checked by the publicity given to
decisions. See, e.g., Ferretti v. Jackson, 188 Atl. 474 (N. H., 1936).
49. CHAMBERLAIMN, LEISLATrmv PRocassEs (1936) 15-17.
50. The doctrine of the non-delegability of legislative power rests alsu upon the
theory that authority cannot, generally speaking, be delegated by the person or body
to whom it is entrusted. Duff & Whiteside, Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari
(1929) 14 COR. L. Q. 168.
51. Dodd, Judicially Non-enforceable Constitutional Provisions (1931) 80 U. or
PA. L. Rnv. 54.
52. See Jacoby, Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review (1936) 36 COL. L. Ra.
871, at 905-907; Cavers, Book Review (1938) 47 YA.E L. J.675.
53. CARR, op. cit. supra note 3', at 18; Comment (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv, 1197.
The English war-time rule-making power was conferred in the famous Defense of
the Realm Act (D.O.R.A.), 4 & 5 Gao. V, c. 29.
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mental system result. 54 Moreover, if legislative resistance to authoritarian
government is overcome by international pressure or by economic conditions or by the threatened use of force, as it was in the European countries
which have yielded to dictatorship, a thin black line of judges, whether
superannuated or rejuvenated, is unlikely to afford a sufficient defense.
Authoritarian government is a horse of different color from the steed
of executive administration performing in the presence of a popularlyelected legislature. Even when the executive is given complete discretionary power in some field of administration, as ordinarily it would not be,
that power is subject to withdrawal. Power over the legislature itself
is a different matter, which the cases do not touch.
b. Difficulties with Administrative Adjudication. The most widely
accepted concept of the mental process of adjudication asserts that the
process involves the ascertainment of facts and the application of the
law to them.55 It is nowhere denied that administrative authorities engage in this process to a large extent. When they do so in the routine
performance of non-discretionary functions, such as the making of
arrests, the abatement of obvious nuisances, the issuance of many types
of licenses, and the conduct of public services, no question of violation
of the doctrine of the separation of powers arises. It is clear also, as
the concept of adjudication would indicate by contrast, that many dis-

cretionary decisions are clearly suitable for administrative rendering."
Some-are regarded as inherently administrative in character.T Difficulty
arises when determinations are required of administrative authorities
in classes of cases traditionally entrusted to the judiciary or similar to
such cases in the types of interests involved. The difficulty would be
less than it is if the judicial process actually carried on by courts always
answered to the concept set forth above and if the courts had not chosen,
for certain purposes, to emphasize "judicial discretion" as a distinguishing characteristic of the functioning of judicial bodies. The latter source
of trouble may be considered first.
The prerogative writs or extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are supposed to issue only to inferior judicial bodies
54. In England the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 [10 & 11 Go. V, c. 55]
remains in force, with an amendment not here relevant, but the power which it confers
is strictly hedged about with safeguards. 17 & 18 GEo. V, c. 22, § 1(4).
55. Brandeis, J., dissenting, in International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U. S. 215, at 262 (1918). See also DicnaNson, op. cit. jupra note 7, at 15-25.
The concept of adjudication, or the mental process by which issues are decided, is
different from that of a court, the type of agency which traditionally has carried on
the process. The latter embraces the manner in which a question arises for decision
(case or controversy) and the force which is given to the judgment when rendered.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
56. See p. 544, supra.
57. See p. 553 ff., infra.
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for the purposes, respectively, of correcting errors of law in cases in
which no appeal lies and of preventing further proceedings in certain
cases in which the lower tribunals lack jtirisdiction. It has long been
established that not only the proceedings of actual courts, but also those
of tribunals whose proceedings are "judicial'in nature," can be reached
by means of these writs." In determining what proceedings fall within
this category the courts have had occasion to discuss the nature of the
judicial process. They have chosen at times to emphasize "discretion"
as the element which distinguishes it from the process which accompanies
"merely ministerial" administrative acts.59 It is difficult to see exactly
what has been meant by this, but apparently the exercise of deliberation,
the careful weighing of evidence, and the application of rules of law,
more or less vague, have been elements in "judicial discretion" for this
purpose. 60 Not only has this theory of the judicial process resulted in
confusion in the field in which it has been employed,"' but it also runs
directly counter to the basic concept of the administrative process in
numerous fields, 6" and verbally counter to the most frequent concept of
the judicial process.
It is true, moreover - turning now to the first of the two difficulties
mentioned above - that, realistically viewed, the judicial process contains
more discretionary elements than orthodox theory has for most purposes
been wont to assume.6 When, therefore, the legislature attempts to
transfer to administrative agencies certain classes of cases which traditionally have fallen to the judicial branch, it is not unnatural for the
courts in applying the doctrine of the separation of powers to stress the
importance of their discretionary functions and to inquire whether any
of them have been transferred. If so, they are likely to brand the delegation as invalid despite the fact that, looked at as a whole, the work
of the executive is more largely characterized by discretion than that of
the judiciary. Thus the constitutionality of workmen's compensation acts
has been established partly by reason of the elimination of negligence as
58.

DICKINSON, op.

cit. supra note 7, at 43.

59. Finkelman, Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law (1936)
1 U. OF TORONTo L. J. 313, at 324-326.
60. DICKINsON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 150.
61. Finkelman, supra note 59, passim.
62. See p. 546, supra.
63. It is, of course, this aspect of judicial functioning which has led the legal
"realists" to minimize the role of legal rules in the determination of cases by the
courts. Not only does judicial behavior, especially in the trial courts, often proceed In
disregard of the rules, but the rules- themselves often allow ample scope for discretion.
This is true (a) where the determination of rather vaguely defined "facts," such as that
of negligence, is left to the judge or to the jury, (b) where judges are required to
apply flexible concepts, such as fraud, reasonableness, or due diligence, in determining
the outcome of cases, and (c) where there is a choice between conflicting rules of law
in reaching a decision.
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an issue in the cases and by the reduction of the measure of recovery
to fairly definite mathematical calculations. 4 When, with less cate or
less possibility of altering the substantive law, the legislature attempts ;.
simple transfer of functions from the courts to administrative agencies,
adverse decisions are likely to resultY5 Although some of these decisions
may be accounted for on other grounds, 6 although others are quite
liberal,6" and although it may be argued that demonstrated necessity will
overcome constitutional objections in future instances as in the workmen's compensation cases, there still remains a very real hazard to the
extension of administrative control over troublesome areas of modern
life6" in which judicial action is pretty clearly inadequate."9 While the
problem has'not become of major importance in the connection now
under discussion, future decisions ought rather to be grounded upon
the necessity both of providing procedures adapted to the determination
of the various types of controversies, and of allocating functions accordingly. This reform would not merely minister to the comfort of
academic theorists who are interested in logical consistency7" but would
also result in decisions that would be more likely to promote efficiency
and fairness in the administrative and judicial systems. 7
c. Judicial Participationin Administration. If it is one corollary of
the separation of powers that essential judicial functions may not be
withdrawn from the courts, it is another that non-judicial functions may
not be imposed upon them. This corollary has two chief consequences
in the field of administration: first, that the courts cannot be required
to render advisory opinions to administrative agencies and second, that
judicial review of administrative decisions must be limited to elements
regarded as judicial.
64. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. WV. 209 (1911); Grand Trunk
Western R.R. v. Industrial Commission, 291 Ill. 167, 125 N. E. 748 (1920).
65. Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals (1923) 36 HAnv. L. REv. 405; Brown,
Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power (1935) 19 M1fi . I. Rnv. 261;
In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N. H. 492, 179 At. 344 (1935); Klein v. Barry,
182 Wis. 255, 196 N. V. 457 (1923).
66. E.g., the binding of persons not parties to the administrative proceedings by the

resulting decisions under attempted Torrens Acts. State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575,
47 N. E. 551 (1897).
67. Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 WVyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258 (1900).
Administrative Finality (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 447.

See Wiel,

68. In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N. H. 492, 179 Atl. 344 (1935).
69. Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance (1925) 25 Coi. L. Ra'. 164;
Symposium on Autonwbile Traffic Accident Compensation (1932) 32 CoL L REv.
785; Comments (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 97, 733; Deak, Liability and Conpensation for
Automobile Accidents (1937) 21 MINx. L. REv. 123.
70. Compare Gavit, Legal Conclusions (1932) 16 blurMz.L. REv. 378; (1933)
9 IND. L. J. 109.
71.

See p. 566, infra. Landis, Administrati'ePolicies and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE

L. J. 519, 535 et seq.
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The proposal was made in England in 1928 to require the judges to
give opinions upon questions of law arising under the Rating and Valuation Bill of that year.72 This suggestion met with the virtually unanimous condemnation of the legal profession on the ground that the
judiciary should not be dragged into the consideration of administrative
measures at times when policy is being formulated, and it was quickly
dropped.7" Legal views of the separation of powers conflicted in this
instance with the political notion that administration should be enabled
to proceed with assurance to the accohnplishment of its appointed ends.
More recent English legislation for effecting housing reform and
other public improvements has tended to the provision of statutory
appeals from orders for improvement schemes within a limited period
following their approval by the Minister of Health.74 Thus, affected
property owners are afforded a simplified, less expensive procedure for
raising legal objections than was available before, and the execution of
the schemes is enabled to proceed with greater certainty after the expiration of the statutory period. It has been suggested that it would be
desirable "to set up some permanent body clothed with power to review
all delegated legislation as it issued and quash any that went beyond
the statutory power."' 75 In this country it has recently been proposed
to employ the Court of Claims as such a body without, however, superseding existing methods of judicial review of administrative regulations.76 Under this plan proceedings might be instituted "in accordance
with the rules of the said court."177 Since the Court of Claims has been
catalogued as a "legislative court" and not a court in the constitutional
sense, 7 no question of the imposition of non-judicial functions upon a
ALLEN, Bup-AucRAcy TRIUMPHANT (1931) at 59, 106 ff.
73. Ibid.; WiLLis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 181-2. For the earlier English history
see Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions (1930) 1 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENCES 475.
74. WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 140.
75. Id., at 181. See also Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 HAnM.
L. REv. 913. For the sake of greater thoroughness and certainty in judicial review of
administrative acts, including general regulations, Professor Arnold is willing to increase
the power of the courts many fold.
76. REPoRT, Ama. BAR AssociArxoN SPECIAL Commi=m ox ADMINIS=AtIvrE LAW

72. See

(1937) at 170, 197, 225.
77. Id., at 225.
78. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 (1933).

Until the decision in Ex

parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438 (1929) the Supreme Court looked upon the Court
of Claims as a judicial body. For that reason the review which the high court gives
to the decisions of the latfer [28 U. S. C. §288 (1934)] has been regarded as appellate
in character and not as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the part of the Supreme
Court. The latter could not be forced upon it. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(U. S. 1803). It is difficult to see how the historical deposit of decisions in regard
to the Court of Claims can be fitted into a logical pattern. For analyses of the holdings
in this field see Katz, Federal Legislative Courts (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 894; Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 344, 746.
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judicial body is precipitated by the proposal. It is not clear whether
proceedings by a mere citizen, which would eventuate in advisory opinions
after-the-fact, or declaratory judgments are contemplated."0 The practical question of the desirable scope of judicial review of administrative
determinations is raised, however, by the fact that the Court of Claims
functions in the manner of a judicial body. 0 As to other courts, this
issue ties itself to the constitutional question of the permissible scope
of judicial review.
It is recognized that administrative proceedings may give rise to issues
which are constitutionally suitable for judicial determination. These may
be collateral issues, such as the liability of a witness to testify,"' questions
of law involved in the main issue to be determined, 2 or the entire case
if it is of a nature which causes it to be looked upon as justiciable, although it does not forbid administrative handling. 3 It is the second

class of issues that requires definition in the effort to impose no more
functions upon the judiciary than the courts regard as falling within
their province. In several cases the Supreme Court refused to entertain
appeals from decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in which that body had reviewed administrative decisions upon the
ground that the lower court had been required by the statute to. make
administrative as well as judicial determinations. Hence the Supreme
Court's power of review was regarded as one of original judicial jurisdiction and therefore as unconstitutional., In these decisions the Supreme
Court reasoned from the premise that the administrative proceedings involved, being discretionary or policy-determining in character, 5 were
essentially "legislative." " This characterization applies particularly to the
79. Compare "any person adversely affected may petition" [see supra note 76, at
170] with "the citizen or other person affected" [Id., at 197]. See also, Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 139;
Ellingwood, Declaratory Judgments in Public Law (1934) 29 ILL. L. Rnv. 1, 17-23,
175-180, 204-213.
80. See FRANKFURTEa AND LANDIs, THE BusinEss or THE Surnz.i Cour'r (1928)
at 63.
81. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894).
82. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266
(1933).
83. Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568 (1926) (naturalization) ; Cleveland Trust
Co. v. Nelson, 51 F. (2d) 276 (E. D. Mich., 1931) (right to patent).
84. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923); Federal Radio

Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930).

Compare the authorities cited

in note 78, supra. The conference of non-judicial functions upon the Court of Appeals

presents no constitutional difficulties since it, like the Court of Claims, is a "legislative
court"-although not for all purposes. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516
(1933).
85. See p. 544 ff., supra.
86. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1903).
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licensing and rate-fixing functions of administrative agencies. The present
Communications Act 7 retains the formula for judicial review in licensing which the Court approved in the Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage
Co. case."' By it the courts are limited to affirming or reversing and
remanding the administrative decisions coming before them, and their
review is restricted to questions of law unless it clearly appears that the
administrative agency's findings of fact are "arbitrary or capricious."
In the fields to which it is applicable, it affords a reasonably satisfactory
solution to a difficult problem. 9 It is, of course, not binding upon the
states, which are free to distribute the powers of government as they
choose. 90
The conception of judicial review involved in the Supreme Court
cases has in one situation been used in a negative way to deny the
character of judicial to "legislative" review by a state court. Consequently, although the review was actually afforded by the same court
that exercised judicial powers and although it embraced all that "judicial" review could include and more besides, it was declared necessary
to superadd a strktly judicial review under the state law in order to
forestall the intervention of a Federal court under the terms of the
Johnson Act.9 The purpose of this Act is to secure an adequate opportunity for judicial review to utilities in rate proceedings and to prevent
the entertainment of injunction proceedings by the Federal courts where
such review is available.9 2 The result of the decision is conceptualism
run riot,93 with the effect of compelling the states to limit court review
under their own laws as the price of forestalling the intervention of the
Federal courts. It is difficult to see what interest will be furthered in
87. Communications Act- of 1934, § 402 (e). 48 STAT. 1093, 47 U. S. C A. § 402(e)
(Supp. 1937).
88. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266,

at 275 (1933).
89. It is not applicable, of course, to all fields of administration, for quite different

formulas for the scope of judicial review are more suitable in many fields. Dickinson,
Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1928) 22 Am. POL. ScL Rav. 275; Isaacs,
Judicial Review of Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YALE L.J. 781; Albertsworth,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1920) 35 HARv. L. REV. 127; Tollefson,
Administrative Fihzality (1931) 29 Micir. L. REV. 839; DIcKINSON, op. cit. supra note
7, at 56-62. When variations are in the direction of restricting the scope of judicial
review, they do not raise the issue of the imposition of non-judicial duties upon the
courts.
90. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908); Porter
v. Investors' Syndicate; 286 U. S. 461 (1932).
91. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma v. Cary, 296 U. S. 452 (1935).
92. Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 119. The Act provides that an injunction shall
not issue if a "plain, speedy, ;Lnd efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity" in
the state courts. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (Supp. 1937).
93. Merrill, Does "Legislative Review" by Courts in Appeals from Public Utility
Commissions Constitute Due Process of Law? (1926) 1 IND. L. J. 247.

19381

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY

the long run by such a holding; but in the meanwhile the purpose of
Congress is to some extent nullified.
The error of providing too much judicial review, it must be noted,
is not far removed from the failure to provide enough; for the requirement of due process of law must be observed in American legislation at
the same time that heed is paid to the theory of the separation of powers.
It is over the desirable minimum of legislative provision of judicial
review and of judicial assertion of reviewing powers that much of the
clash of theories in administrative law has taken place. This subject,
in turn, relates to that of the optimum distribution of controlling powers
in administration. The discussion may now proceed to a consideration
of these questions.
The Preservationof the "Rule of Law" Through
Judicial Control of Administration
a. The Classic Theory. It is impossible within the space of a single
article to discuss even in outline the entire subject of judicial review of
administrative determinations. In the course of the extensive consideration given to this topic94 much has been said of the "rule of law" on
the one hand and of the desirability of securing administrative responsibility to higher political authority, in order that current policies may
be well effectuated, on the other. These opposing views, emanating
from legal and political sources respectively, challenge not only each other
but also the view that what need primarily to be considered are the
practical ends that lie back of the concepts.
Dicey, whose name is most frequently and most prominently associated with the "rule of law" and who gave it its classic formulation,
divided it into three aspects: (1) "that no man is punishable or can
be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach
of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary
courts of the land;" 95 (2) "that . . . every man, whatever be his rank
or tradition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals;"" and (3) "that the
general principles of the constitution . . . are with us the result of
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular
94. See authorities cited supra note 89, and Landis, Administrative Policies and the
Courts (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 519; FREu.vD, ADnINXsTATwE POWEs oEn Pftmo.s
AND PROPERTY (1928) cc. 13, 14, and 5; Comment (1935) 35 Cot. L REV. 230;
Powell, Principles of Judicial Rezie, (1913) 28 PotL Sci. Q. 34; Comment (1934)
JuDicAL
43 YALE L. J. 599; Comment (1933) 33 Co.. L REv. 105; 'MCFAnLA-:,
REvIEw OF THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE CONIMISSION AND THE FEDMEAL TraZ CoM-

.iissix (1933); Brown, Functions of Courts and Counnissions ilPublic Utility Rate
Regulation (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 141.
95. LAw OF THE CoNsrruTION (1885) 172.
96. Id., at 177.
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cases brought before the Courts." 7 The first aspect, according to Dicey,
stands in contrast to "the exercise by persons in authority of wide,
arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint ;" the second to a system
of droit administratif, in which public officials are not answerable for
their official acts in the ordinary courts but, instead, to administrative
tribunals; and the third to systems in which "the security (such as it is)
given to the rights of individuals results, or appears to result, from the
general principles of the constitution." In so far as the "rule of law"

is looked upon as good-as of course it is-all three aspects magnify
the beneficence and importance of the courts.
Although the preceding discussion has shown that the distrust of
discretionary administrative powers on the part of Dicey and his followers has not prevented the increase of these powers, it has also shown
that the desire to limit them as much as possible is widespread. Dicey
himself later modified his unfavorable judgment of French droit admin9
istratif,
and the notion that during the past half century it has represented tyranny in any sense has been completely exploded.90 The Committee on Ministers' Powers, however, still felt called upon in 1932
to reject emphatically the suggestion that a similar system of administrative tribunals be set up in England, upon the ground of "the fundamental
necessity of not only maintaining but strengthening the supremacy of
the Law," which "involves the equal subjection of all classes to regular
Law administered by the ordinary Courts of Law." 100 The notion that
the courts are the sole authors of liberty under the English constitution
is obviously contrary to the facts ;1O1 but it is still possible for the editors
of an important current work to utter the solemn absurdity that "In
comparison with cases, statutes have for the most part only a fleeting
interest. They indeed regulate the constitution and powers of most of
our public authorities, but the mode of exercise of those powers is in
the main a matter of Common Law." 1 2
With such an attitude prevailing in important quarters, it is small
cause for wonder that attempts to limit or abolish judicial review of
administrative determinations should result in protests and in effort on
the part of the courts to escape from the limitations. Nor is it surprising

that courts should display a tendency to exercise broadly those powers
97. Id., at 208.
98. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915) Introduction; Frankfurter, The Task
of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 614, at 615.

99. Garner, French Administrative Law (4934) 33 YALE L. J. 597; Garner, AngloAmerican and ContinentalEuropean Administrative Law (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV.

387; Morgan, Introduction to
(1925)

at"Lxii-lxvii.

ROBINSON, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND LEGAL LIABILITY

(1932) 113.

100.

REPORT

101.

JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION (1933) 34-36.
See KEIR & LAWSON, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1928)

102.

at v.

1938]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY

of review which they have always had or which legislation has conferred
upon them and which there has been no effort to limit. For both these
tendencies there is, moreover, a reason more fundamental than affection
for the courts as institutions; for it has been perceived that the legislation conferring administrative powers is collectivist, or "socialistic,"
in its purposes. Dicey, who gave clear expression to his understanding
of this tendency in modem legislation, 10 3 was able on the whole to view
it with detachment and to expound it intelligently. As much cannot be
said for some others who believe they sense the same truth. Thus it
has been said that the "creed of socialism" embodied in the Housing
Acts involves "the obliteration of private rights," apparently without
discrimination. 0 It follows that the "interference with private rights,"
resulting from legislative effectuation of "socialism," "must be limited
to such a degree as is in accordance with public opinion;"'01 this Parliament, no doubt, does not reflect, and, therefore, it must be effectuated
by the courts. It is still, in this view, no part of the business of government to provide the necessaries of life to the people.0 3 Since the contrary creed, which actuates the legislation, is not expressed upon the face
of the statutes, the judges can and do, while adhering to alleged canons
of statutory construction, exercise their reviewing function in the light
of their own views of policy so as at times to limit the effectiveness of
the administrative powers conferred. 10 7 Hence legislation and adlninistration, representing the force of collectivism, clakh to some extent
with the courts, representing the interests of property owners; and the
"rule of law" takes on a7 deeper significance.
b. Review of Administrative Ride-Making. Attempts on the part of
Parliament to eliminate judicial review of the regulations resulting from
certain delegated rule-making powers furnished the principal ground of
attack in 1929 upon the "New Despotism" of administrative authorities.
Lord Chief Justice Hewart, in that year, published his colorfully-entitled
volume 0 8 and precipitated the agitation that led to the appointment of
the Committee on Ministers' Powers. Lord Hewart depicted a permanent
bureaucracy grasping for power and rapidly securing it by means of the

delegation to itself of broad rule-making authority in legislation which
it drafted and foisted upon an unsuspecting Parliament and public. In
order to overcome the last defense of the citizen, the legislation fore103.

LAw AND OPINIoN

N ENGLAND

(1905)

passim.

104. Potter, Legislative Powers of Public Authorities (1928) 6 J. PuB. AD-MI. 32,
at 39.
105. Ibid.
106. See MAIorr, How

ENGLAND

Is GovERNED (1928), at 86.

107. Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing
Legislation (1936) 49 HAiv. L Rzv. 426.
108. HxwArr, THE

NEw

Dsporosi

(1929).
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stalled judicial- review by giving to the departmental regulations the
final effect of statutory provisions. An undercurrent of similar criticism
that had been running for some time, was fed by additional streamlets
thereafter. 0 9
The Committee on Ministers' Powers was unable to uncover the fire
of which the Lord Chief Justice thought he had seen the smoke. While
asserting that the public should be "grateful for outspoken criticism,
even if exaggerated,""10 the Committee negatived "the suggestion, unsupported as it is by the smallest shred of evidence," that the curtailment of judicial review in certain statutes "is due directly or indirectly
to any attempt or desire on the part of members of the permanent civil
service to secure for themselves or for their Departments an arbitrary
power.""' On the contrary, the Committee saw "nothing to justify any
lowering of the country's high opinion of its civil service or any reflection
on its sense of justice, or any ground for a belief that our constitutional
machinery is developing in directions which are fundamentally wrong." '1 2
The attempted immunization of departmental regulations from judicial
review is the product of a system of legislation and of administrative
powers which should be outlined briefly. Important bills are introduced
and sponsored in Parliament by the government. The departments concerned play a large part in their preparation. On the legal aspects of
proposed measures the solicitors of the departments are consulted. The
actual work of drafting centers in the office of the Chief Parliamentary
Counsel, nominally in the Treasury Department. Many of the most important measures resulting from this process have conferred extensive
rule-making powers upon the departments. Usually the authorized regulations are framed and announced by the departments themselves; but
under certain laws concerning local imllrovements and measures of economic reconstruction within particular industries, "schemes" formulated
by local authorities or by statutory boards or corporations are submitted
for ministerial approval by a procedure which takes the place of the
well-known machinery of private bill legislation. Some of the resulting
rules and "schemes" require enactment as laws by Parliament before
taking effect; some call for approval by resolution; most take effect after
having lain before Parliament a specified number of days without adverse
action by that body; and a smaller number are made effective through
departmental action alone. Those of general application are published' in
the annual volumes of Statutory Rules and Orders, whose bulk in com109. ALLEN, BuREAucRAcy TRiumPHANT (1931); works cited in WiLtis, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 29, and Finkelman, loc. cit. supra note 59; KEm & LAWSON, op. cit.
supra note 102, at 143.
110. REoRT (1932), at 7.

111. Id., at 59.

112. Id., at 7.
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parison with that of the acts of Parliament has been a matter of much
comment. Power to adopt regulations which shall take effect as if enacted
in the authorizing act and the power to modify an act by rule have been
conferred upon government departments. Both of these types of rulemaking authority are immune from judicial check to an undetermined
extent. Occasionally even more drastic power has been bestowed."'
In the absence of alertness and independence on the part of Parlia-

ment,"' there seems on the face of the foregoing system to be an almost

perfect opportunity for the seizure of power on the part of the administration. Actually, as the conclusions of the Committee on Ministers'
Powers indicate, nothing of the sort has occurred. Not only is there no
discoverable disposition on the part of the civil service to engage in any
such usurpation, but important decisions in the preparation of bills are
made, it is alleged, by the responsible ministers themselves."" The departmental solicitors are lawyers jealous of their professional indeoendence
and integrity.1 6 The office of Parliamentary Counsel is careful to remain
within the limits of approved policy. Where broad rule-making powers
are in terms conferred, they have, almost without exception, been used
for limited and proper purposes. 11 7 At most, the system has lacked uniformity and simplicity, and there has been some tendency to employ
unnecessarily such stock phrases as the one that regulations "shall have
effect as if enacted in this Act."1 1 8 Thus the check of judicial review,
113. Detailed citation of supporting authorities will not be attempted here. All of
the points mentioned are covered in detail in works already cited and in I.nnv, MEnTons
op I xisLAi x (1912) and TRE MEcHamcs OF LAW MArNG (1914); F/mamL,
ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN CONNECTION ivrriSTATUTonY RuLE.s AND OnwEns mI
GREAT BrTAiN (1925).

As regards economic reconstruction by industries in the field

of agriculture see Elliot, Solutions of Certain New Problems in Administration (1936)
14 J.PuB. Axnix. 1. For similar legislation in related fields see Jennings, Notes on
Administrative Law (1937) 15 J. PuB. ADmni. 97.
114. The thesis that in most matters Parliament is thoroughly controlled by the
government in power is stated in Mum, How BRrrAIN Is GovEa;E (1929).
115. ComTr=E ON MiNxsTEas' Powms, MINUTES OF EvMENcE (1932) at 3 (testimony of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer, Treasury Solicitor).
116. Id., at 2, 7.
117. Commrrm ON MIsNSTERs' Powms, MEMORANDA By GovEnNmENT
(1932) 31-33; REPORT at 54; Wn.us, op. cit. supra note 14, at 151.

IIENTS

Dr.-rr"In my

experience few powers are exercised by the Department with more anxious care, and
I would add, with a greater desire to serve the public, than the power to make rules
and regulations which have the force of law." Gwyer, The Powery of Public Departments to Make Rule.? Having the Force of Law (1927) 5 J. Pun. A.u;. 404. It has,
however, been asserted that income tax regulations have occasionally been framed with
deliberate vagueness so as to keep would-be tax avoiders guessing and permit interpretation that might defeat their schemes. WnILs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 54.
11& CoMMInrra ON MINISTERS' POWERS, MINUTES OF EvIDENcE (1932) at 4 (testimony of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer).
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if needed at all, is needed for less weighty reasons than the defeat of
tyranny.
Potential rather than actual danger"' 9 has been suggested as a justification for the recommendation that judicial review of the vires of administrative rules should in virtually all cases be preserved. 20 Whatever the
reason, ,the practice of providing explicitly for such review and for review
of departmental compliance with due procedure in the framing of regula1 21
tions has become quite uniform in recent English "scheme" legislation.
The crucial issue is whether the resulting elimination of "potential"
danger of administrative abuse is purchased at the price of actual unwarranted judicial interference with administration. One observer states
that in the case of housing legislation it has. 22 Although statutory
appeals are limited in point of time, principles of strict construction,
extending to the details of administrative procedure, have been followed
in the decisions. In order to overcome them and forestall future decisions
of the same kind, the statutes are being made "more and more detailed"
and are certain to "give rise to increasing difficulties of interpretation."
The English courts have also exhibited a tendency to extend their nonstatutory powers of review. In 1929 a housing scheme was held sufficiently "judicial" to justify the use of the writ of prohibition to prevent
its further consideration because the scheme's sweeping terms were
thought to make it ultra vires.123 Certiorari has become a recognized
means of reviewing the procedural aspects of the formulation of such
schemes following their departmental approval. 2 4 Although statutory
appeals are now substituted for these non-statutory proceedings in the
field of housing and slum clearance, the cases remain as precedents for
the review of other administrative determinations.
All in all, therefore, one may say with regard to judicial review of
the exercise of delegated rule-making power in England, that its alleged
justification in actual administrative abuse has been disproven, that its
scope has to some extent been enlarged by Parliament as a safeguard
against "potential" abuse, and that the consequences may be harmful
unless judicial appreciation of the work of the "bureaucracy" increases
as a result of its vindication by the Committee on Ministers' Powers
and as a consequence of the growing necessity for it. In the United
119. ComImrrE oN MINisTERs' PowERs, REPORT (1932) at 54.
120. Id., at 61.
121. Hart, Administration and the Law (1936) 14 J. Pus. ADMiN. 301; WUL.LW,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 41.
122. Jennings,. Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing
Legislation (1936) 49 HARv. L REv. 426; Hart, loc. cit. supra note 121.
123. Rex v. Minister of Health [1929] 1 K. B. 619. See also Rex v. Electricity
Commissioners [1924] 1 K. B. 171.
124. Minister of Health v. The King on the Prosecution of Yaffe [19311 A. C.
494, at 513.

1938]

563

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY

States no similar problem of judicial review has as yet arisen with
regard to administrative rule-making.'r
c. Review of Administrative Decisions. That aspect of the "rule of
law" which relates to judicial review of administrative decisions, i.e.,
orders directed to particular situations or persons, stands upon a somewhat different footing from review of general regulations. Not only
are persons and property immediately affected by such orders; not only
are the courts more at home in this field; but, in addition, some evidence
of definite abuses by administrative authority has been brought forward.
In England unauthorized exaction of money in connection with the
issuance of licenses seems to have occurred (although not for the personal profit of officials);"26 the Federal Trade Commission was for
some years guilty of unfairness in its proceedings;127 the conduct of
deportation proceedings in the United States was at one time a national
scandal;"28 and the occasional malpractices of incompetent, politicallychosen local officials in the administration of occupational licensing,
health, and building laws are a matter of common knowledge. If judicial
review can aid in correcting such conditions without unduly hampering
administration, it will assist materially in the governmental process.
Unfortunately, however, judicial review has only occasionally reached
the evils which call for correction. The fault in this connection does
not lie with the judges. Either the available procedure for invoking
their review has been expensive or unknown to the uninformed persons
with whom the administration has dealt, as in the field of deportation,
or else it has been impossible for the courts, exercising a review limited
to questions of law and to procedural errors appearing on the face of
a written record, to penetrate to the factual issues that usually lie at the
center of the difficulty. 1'9 Review by non-expert judges or juries of the
technical fact determinations involved in large areas of modem administration, even where private interests are directly affected, would be
neither desirable nor possible. 130 The courts themselves have generally
recognized their relative incompetence in such matters. At the same
125.
126.
127.

See note 46, supra.
ALLE, op. cit. supra note 109, at 36-39.
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE

Co tmissxoN (1924) cc. 2, 3.

128. REPTR, NATIONAL COmimssiON O:N' LAW

OBSERVAIX AND LAW

Eznv-CM'ENT

CONTROL or Amr.s (1932); CuAnxr,
DEPoRTATro- OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE (1931).
129. The Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association
has rightly emphasized the critical importance of th6 facts in administrative proceedings
(1931)

Part 5; VA^zVLcK, THE AomamsmATvnn

as in judicial. 61 A. B. A. REP. 720, at 739-740, 764-765 (1936); 59 A. B. A. RE,.
539. at 546-547 (1934). See also Guthrie, Problems of the Bar (1923) 46 N. Y. STATE
B. A. REP. 169.
130. DICKINSOn, op. cit. supra note 7, at 71-73, 254; HENDERSON, op.
note 127, at 97.

cit. 4uIpa
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time they often have felt impelled to assert to the limit such powers as
they have possessed, both for the purpose of preserving a vaguely-defined
"rule of law" and of indirectly checking what they have regarded, rightly
or wrongly, as administrative abuses.
Judicial review has done its part in reversing arbitrary action and in
establishing norms of administrative procedure.' Its operation, however,
has not always been attended with happy restilts. The issues in cases
involving the review of administrative decisions have too often related,
on the one hand, to collateral points of administrative procedure 32 and,
on the other, to matters of judgment, such as the value of a utility's
property, which the courts have been able to brand as questions of law183
or of "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" fact' 4 - upon many of which
they are at least as likely as an administrative commission to be wrong.
Public interest as seen by an administrative agency and private interest
as represented by a particular respondent have contended for advantage
in the judicial forum and have necessarily centered upon fragmentary
issues.
An enlarged conception of the proper role of the courts in their review
of administrative determinations is indicated by a series of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Although it had long been established as a
general proposition that "due process is not necessarily judicial process,' 3 5 it has now been decided that, after all, due process of law requires
judicial determination of the facts involved in issues of constitutional
right in administrative proceedings. Thus the minimum valuation of a
public utility which will avoid "confiscatory" consequences in a ratefixing proceeding must be left open to determination by a judicial body
exercising its "independent judgment" whenever the issue is raised. 800
The fact of alienage is, as a matter of due process involving the deter131. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 301 U. S.
292 (1937); Mort, DuE PiocEss oF LAW (1926) 216 ff.; Comments (1931) 80 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 96, 878; (1934) 34 COL. L. Rxv. 332; Hanft, Utilities Commissions as
Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. REv. 12.
132. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920); Kwock Jan Fat

v. White, 253 U. S. 454 (1920); Lloyd Sabando Societa v. Elting, 287

U. S,329

(1932); United States v. Abilene & Southern R. Co., 265 U. S. 274 (1924); United
States v. B. & 0. R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935).
133. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920) (nature cf unfair
competition); International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291
(1930) (sufficiency of evidence to support finding of substantial lessening of competition
by merger) ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.466 (1898) (method of valuing railway property
for rate-fixing purposes).
134. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.22 (1932) (existence of employer-employee relationship in compensation proceeding).
135. Moni, op. cit. supra note 131, at 215.
136. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920) ; Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930).
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mination of a "jurisdictional fact," open to judicial reexamination upon
review of a deportation proceeding.' 37 "Jurisdictional" facts in Federal
administrative proceedings which the Supreme Court calls judicial must
be determined by a court because it is essential to the preservation of
the judicial power under the Constitution that they be not settled conclusively by administrative determinations. Hence the existence of the
employer-employee relationship between the claimant and the respondent
in a Federal workmen's compensation proceeding, which is said to be
essential to the power of Congress to provide for liability without fault,
is "jurisdictional," and a reviewing court must be free to determine it for
itself. 3 ' Finally, the court is free in a rate case, if it thinks proper, to
admit additional evidence upon the issue of confiscation even where,
upon statutory review of a Federal agency's decision, it is confronted
with an administrative record.130
Thus, by means of doctrines created out of whole cloth, the Court has
raised the strong possibility that administrative proceedings of the highest
importance will be rendered less effective by retrials and by judicial
reversals upon points which are only fragments of the entire causes. 140
This development has resulted from a number of factors: in the utility
cases, perhaps, a desire to protect the interests of corporate property
holders; in the deportation cases a strong disposition to right the wrongs
committed by a poorly-manned administrative agency employing an inadequate procedure; and in Crowell v. Benson and St. Joseph Stock Yard
Co. v. Wallace quite clearly a distrust of administrative agencies and a
belief in the superiority of the courts, which is closely analogous to
English professional fondness for the "rule of law." It is the latter
factor which is of primary concern here. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking for the Court, gave utterance to his views upon the point:
"The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative
agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their proper
province, and the support of their authorized action, does not require
the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the
137. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922). Because review ,,as had in a
habeas corpus proceeding, the court was of course free, if not compelled, to receive
evidence upon the issue, if it was to review the point at all.
138. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). It was held, partly for statutory and
partly for constitutional reasons, that the review should be by trial de novo.
139. St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. Wallace, 298 U. S. 38 (1936) ; Baltimore & Ohio
R. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349 (1936). The power to admit additional evidence
is, however, to be. used sparingly. Compare Acker v. United States, 293 U. S. 426

(1936).
140. See the dissents of Ar. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.22
(1932) and St. Joseph Stock Yard v. Wallace, 298 U. S.38 (1936); Dickinson, Crowell
v. Bentson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinatlion of Questions of "Consfifutional Fact" (1932) 80 U. oF P&. L REV. 1055.
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Congress could completely oust the courts of all determinations of
fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in its own
instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That would be
to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution,
and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to
our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently
they, do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in
eftect finality in law."' 141
Whether the courts actually furnish superior security to liberty and
property; whether administrative findings upon "facts" such as valuation, which are matters of judgment, are more likely to be "wrong" than
the conclusions of the courts; and whether the courts or administrative
agencies are better equipped to give due weight to the interests of the
community: these are the crucial 'questions raised by the view of Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes. Mere opinions, from whatever sources they
emanate, cannot resolve these issues. Of opinions there have been more
than enough ;142 of evidence only a little. Gradually, however, a literature of administrative law which reveals the actual workings of administrative agencies is being built up. 43 It is not too much to hope that
the increasing devotion of effort and money to research in this field
will produce a better understanding of what is taking place and will

result in the adjustment of legislative and judicial policies to the need
for efficient, fair administration."'
141.

285 U. S. at 57.

142 Much has been made of the "combination of prosecutor and judge" which exists
in many administrative agencies. COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS, REPORT (1932)
at 78, suggesting that service of the public interest by an official may be more destructive
of impartiality than the involvement of self-interest, since it may be unrestrained by
conscientiousness; 61 A. B. A. REPORT (1936) at 732-736. To this contention the reply
is made that judicial zeal in behalf of private as against public interest is at least
as warping in its effects. Perhaps the best summary, albeit somewhat idealized, of the
respective qualities of judicial and administrative determining processes is contained in
ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1928).
143. See e.g., PATTERsON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES
(1927); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMI.xSSION (1924); SIIARFMAN, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE CO,MaISSIoN (5 vols., 1931-1937); DODD, ADMINISTRATION OP
WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION

(1936); surveys of deportation administration, cited slipra

note 128; Brown, The Administration of Workmen's Compensation in IVisn..': (1935)

10 Vis. L. REV. 345; McClintock, The Administrath'e Determination &1 Public Land
Controversies (1925) 9 MIN,. L. REv. 638; Hyneman, The Case Law of the New
York Public Ser-vice'Commission (1934) 34 COL. L. Rav. 67; Garrison, The National
Railroad Adjustment Board (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 567; CO.IER, LEGISLATIE FUNcTIONS
cc. vii, viii; Wheat, The Railor NATIONAL AD.uINISTRATIVt AUTHORITIES (1927)
road Commission of California (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 445. As to the personnel
of the independent Federal commissions see HERRING, FEDERAL COMMISSIONERS (1936).
144. The threat presented by the Supreme Court cases on judicial review may not
materialize, and the effects of the distrust of administrative authority which it expresses
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Legislative remedies lie, in the first place, in improving the personnel
of administrative agencies so as to minimize the need for review of
administrative determinations. In some matters nothing more seems
necessary. Whether an animal is diseased and hence subject to destruction in order to prevent the spread of the disease is a matter which may
as well be determined once and for all by a competent expert, subject to
the assumption of liability by the state if a claims tribunal finds that an
error has been made. "Where human interests are more directly involved,
as in the determination of insanity and of the need for asexualization,
a tribunal should be set up with a lawyer, mindful of standards of fair
procedure, as one of its members, or judicial review of essential procedural points should be provided, or both safeguards should be afforded.
Where more judgment and less cold fact are involved in a decision, some
review of the initial determination probably is wise, if only to satisfy
the natural feeling of those adversely affected. The tendency among
students of administrative law in this connection, is to advocate administrative tribunals with broad reviewing powers, to precede or supplant
the courts as reviewing agencies. 14" The principal questions involved in
the proposal are, first, whether there should be a single set of such

tribunals with inclusive jurisdiction, as in France, or a number of specialized tribunals and, second, how much of the field of administration
should be subjected to their control.
In the Federal system in the United States, specialized appellate tribunals such as the Customs Court, have been established in a number of
fields of administration. 146 These are not courts in the full sense and
may be mitigated, by reason both of changing personnel upon the court and the opportunity for a new doctrinal start which is presented by recent legislation. The tourts
are now directed, in case the presentation of additional evidence should be permitted
following an appeal from an administrative order (reasonable ground for the failure
to adduce it earlier having been shown), to remand the case for the taking of such
evidence and, if necessary, the modification oi the order. Bituminous Coal Act (1937)
§§6(b), (c), 50 STAT. 85, 15 U. S. C. A. §§836(b), (c) (Supp. 1937); National
Labor Relations Act (1935) §§ 10(e), (f), 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 160(e), (f)
(Supp. 1937); Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935) § 24, 49 STAT. 834, 15
U. S. C. A. § 79(x) (Supp. 1937) ; Securities Exchange Act (1934) § 25, 48 STAT. 90,
15 U. S. C. A. § 78(y) (Supp. 1937).
145. Hart, The President aid Federal Adfninistration, in volume of essays cited
op. cit. supra note 3, at 92; WADE & PHILLIPS, CONSTITTIONAL LAW (2d ed., 1935)
at 99; Jennings, loc. cit. supra note 122; Willis, op. cit. mspra.note 20, at 59-60; A!smz
BAR AssocATozz, REPORT or SPECIAL Co. T.rrr on ADuzisTraArLv LAw (1936)
61 A. B. A. REP. 720.
146. Customs Court, 46 STAT. 730, 737 (1930), 19 U. S. C. A. §§ 1501, 1518 (1934);
Board of Patent Appeals, 4-1 STAT. 1336 (1927), 35 U. S. C. A. §57 (1934); Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 45 STAT. 1476 (1929), 35 U. S. C. A. §59(a) (1934),
28 U. S. C. A. §303(a) (1934) ; 46 STtT. 762 (1930), 28 U. S. C. A. §§301(a), 303
(1934); Board of Tax Appeals, 44 STAT. 105 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §650 ff (1934).
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may be composed partly of officials who have had administrative experience. They may review both the law and the facts, and thus are able
to penetrate to the heart of the controversies involved and to render
informed decisions. Their work seems to have met with general approval.
It has been proposed both that reviewing tribunals be set up in other
Federal agencies which make decisions affecting private interests"I and
that the existing tribunals be consolidated into a Federal administrative
court whose jurisdiction shall be exten'ded from time to time over additional "judicial" determinations of the Government's administrative
agencies.14 It does not follow from the success of the present tribunals,
however, that similar bodies are necessary or would operate successfully
in all other fields of administration; and it is possible that a consolidated
administrative court would lack the expertness of the existing bodies in
relation to the matters coming before it.' 49 Its attitude might become too
largely detached and "judicial," or even hostile. At least one ill-fated
experiment, the Commerce Court, has shown the harmful effect of review
by a specialized tribunal whose attitude was of this variety - although
it is probable that the difficulty in the particular instance lay partly in
current political conditions and in a combination of specialization,
limited scope of review, and strictly judicial methods and personnel. 1 0

The course of wisdom is to introduce appellate administrative tribunals
into particular fields of administration as their presence is shown to be
needed,' taking care that they have the characteristics of both expertness and fairness, rather than to attempt to legislate at one fell swoop
for the entire executive branch of the Federal Government. At the same
time the effort should be made to restrict the review of their determinations by the regular courts as fully as the legal competence of their
membership," 2 the need of unity in the adminstrative system, and the
147. Op. cit. supra note 76, at 170-172, 199 ff., 225-228.
148. AmERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITE ON ADMINISTRALAw (1936) 61 A. B. A. REP. 720. This proposal has now yielded to the one
previously mentioned. Op. cit. supra note 76, at 184.
149. The American Bar Association Committee, however, contemplated a court
which should be divided into sections with specialized functions. REPORT (1936) 61
TE

A. B. A. REP. 720, at 745.
150. See

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS

OF THE SUPREME COURT

(1928)

at 153-174.
151. See the recommendation of the National Commission on Law Observance and
Law Enforcement with respect to the Immigration Service of the Department of Labor,
in loc. cit. supra note 12g; Oppenheimer, Recent Developments in the Deportation Process
(1938) 36 MICH. L. REv. 355.
152. There is little indication in the literature of a disposition to dispense with legal

competence in the conduct of administration. The lawyer in administration is essentially
an expert in procedure, and there is need for his services wherever governmental

processes, making use of sanctions, are employed.
(1932) at 114.

FREUND, LEGISLATIV
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state of constitutional doctrine will allow. Consolidation of tribunals,
or extension of their jurisdiction, can then take place as expediency
dictates, after the manner of
the formation of the present Court of
1 53
Appeals.
Patent
and
Customs
Proposals of a sweeping character for the establishment of appellate
administrative tribunals encounter the difficulty of defining in general
terms the type of administrative determination to be reviewed. For this
purpose the terms "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" are commonly employed.
Their lack of precision has been amply demonstrated.'s In an apparent
attempt to avoid such ambiguity, the latest recommendation of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, which
calls for administrative appeal boards in many federal agencies, would
confer power to review any "decision, act, or failure to act" whereby
any person "is aggrieved.' "I An appeal would lie from the appeal boards
to the Circuit Courts of Appeal. The apparent effect would be to compel
"quasi-judicial" procedure whenever someone asserted a grievance in
the prescribed manner.
The Formulation and Effectuation of Policy through Administration
As an accompaniment to the discussion of the "rule of law" in English
administrative law literature, there is a recognition of "ministerial
responsibility" as a fundamental principle to which effect must be given
so far as possible. " ' This responsibility assumes two aspects: first,
control by department heads over their subordinates, and second, answerability by the former to Parliament. The English system of regulatory
and welfare administration began with commissions created by, and

reporting directly to, Parliament. " ' It has evolved into a system of
153.

45 STAT. 1475 (1929).

154. Cooper, The Proposed United States Adninistrative Court, Part II (1937)
35 Mica. L. REv. 565; Hyneman, Administrati'e Adjudication: An Analysis (1935)
51 Por- Scr. Q. 383; O'Reilly, lac. cit. supra note 26. Professor William A. Robson
made a gallant attempt to define the content of these terms before the Committee on
Ministers' Powers, but it broke down completely. .MXNiu's or EvMENcn (1932) at
63 ff., 81 ff.
155. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 76, at 225.
156. Even the advocates of imposing additional controls upon the exercise of discretionary powers by the departments concede that these should not tie the minister's
hands in matters in which he is responsible to Parliament. Cumzurrrm our linasTnEs'
PowERs, M.L-TEs or Evso.-cz (1932) at 100 (testimony of Mr. H. A. Hill). See
also the testimony of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer. Id., at 31. The procedure of laying
administrative rules before Parliament for a period of time before they become effective
[see supra p. 560] is a recognition of "responsibility" as well as of the legislative
character of the rules. Its effectiveness is a matter of dispute. Id., at 45 (testimony
of Sir William Graham-Harrison; Id., at 123 (testimony of Sir Arthur Robinson and
Mr. E. J. 1Maude).
157. Anderson, Bureaucracy (19-9) 7 J. PuB Amnt. 3, at 9"; ,VxUs, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 17.
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single-headed departments, 15 8 with occasional boards performing specific
functions.159 The minister in charge of each department has complete
authority over it. Answerability to Parliament is by the ministers collectively through the Cabinet and by each minister personally through
his subjection to interrogation on the floor of Parliament by the members. The latter device for securing "responsibility" furnishes the most
available political check upon departmental acts affecting private persons
and property; for it is not difficult for an aggrieved constituent to have
his grievance made the subject of questioning by the member who represents him in the House of Commons.
Interrogation furnishes, to some extent, an alternative to judicial
review as a safeguard to the interests that are affected by administration. 160 It operites through the channel by which policy is transmitted
from its source in the legislature to the point at which it finally results
in official action. Thus it conforms to a concept of efficiency in administration which is central in modern political-science theory. That concept requires the continuous control of administration by the policydetermining agency of the government and means whereby'administration is kept in touch with those interests in the community upon which
it bears. The latter element will be considered first.
The maintenance of contact with affected interests in administration
occurs both in connection with rule-making and in the process of making
decisions. In the former it is accomplished largely through consultation
with these interests; in the latter through the device of notice and hearing. In so far as these devices are effective, and in so far as the initial
formulation of policy by the legislature is accomplished with due participation by all recognized interests, the need of an external check upon
administration, at the hands of the courts or otherwise, is diminished."'
The formulation of policy by the legislature is beyond the scope of this
paper. The matter of notice and hearing in connection with administrative decisions has been extensively treated in the literature.10 2 The
device of consultation should, however, be noticed briefly here.
158. Even the Board of Trade. in whose name vast functions are carried on, is in
effect a mythical body. It never meets, and the department which it controls in name
is in reality a ministry which is headed by the President.
159. Anderson, loc. cit. .supra note 157. There is a recent tendency to set up special
boards, or authorities, for the conduct of economic schemes under government auspices.
See Elliot, loc. cit. supra note 113.
160. One of the grounds of decision in the famous Arlidge case [(1915) A. C. 1201
was that the officials of the Local Government Board might properly be allowed some
freedom in the procedure by which they determined the unsuitability of the petitioner's
building for human habitation, because they were answerable in Parliament for what
they did.
161. Gaus, The Responsibility of Public Administration in GAITS, Wn
& DiMocix,

*TE FRONTxEaS o PuBLc ADMIIISTRATION (1936) at 37.
162. See the authorities cited supra, note 131.
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In England the consultation of affected interests by the government
departments entrusted with rule-making functions has become a recognized practice that is almost uniformly followed.10 3 Of necessity, the
methods by which this consultation is effected vary with the forms of
group organization with which the ministry is confronted; and there
are important unorganized interests which the ministry itself must, in
a sense, represent." 4 But the practice appears to have been largely successful. Under it the citizen is not "treated as an inert subject or as an
aggressive person eager to outwit the law or obtain some special advantage."' ' He, or his group, is treated as a rightful participant in
administration; and the resulting governmental measures, which take
account of his needs and his wishes, are much more likely to meet with
his approval than would otherwise be the case. These consultative means
have thus effected "an extension of representative government . .
in the course of the last century."'
Although no such uniformity in the practice of consultation has grown
up in the United States, the constant stream of conferences between
governmental agencies and business interests indicates that the device
is frequently resorted to. 6 7 Somewhat anomalous is the Federal Trade
Commission's trade practice conference procedure. No official action.
results from it; yet understandings of the highest importance are reached

with trade and industrial groups in regard to future competitive prac10 8

tices.
More formal in character are the advisory committees attached to
various administrative agencies for the purpose of reflecting the opinion
of affected interests and of interpreting official action to those interests1c"
163. CAR, DErLEGTE LEGISLATION (1921) at 31-32; BuRNs, GoVMNENT AND
(1921) at -86 ff.; CoMMIrTE oN MINsERs' PoERS, MIUTrES or EVIDCZ

INDUsTRY

(1932) at 5 (testimony of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer); Id., at 120 (Supplementary Memo.
of the Ministry of Health); Wade, Departmental Legislation (1933) 5 CA11B. L. J.
77, at 81; 2 ANSo N, LAw AND CusToM OF THE CoNsnrruTION (4th ed. by Keith, 1935)
at 256.
164. See Coulrrrr o-T Mnuisms' PowERs, MI Uzs or Evmrncz (1932) at 120
(Supplementary Memo. from the Ministry of Health).
16.5. Gaus, A Theory of Organization in Public Administration, in GAus, WHITE S:
DrmocK, op. cit. supra note 161, at 88. See also LAsKI, GRAMMAn or PoLTIs (1925)
at 244 ff. For a thorough account of American experience and its significance see
HERRING, PUBLiC ADMINIsTRAIONo Alto THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936).
166. Suggestion of Sir Leslie Scott, member of the Committee on Ministers' Powers.
MINUTES OF EVIDENcE (1932) at 130.
167. CoMz, op. cit. supra note 143, cc. 7, 8.
168. See OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE REGuLATION (1936) at 1305.
169. MACHINERY OF GOVERNmENT COMMITTEE or THE [British] MINISTRY OF RZcONsTucrio.,- (1918) at 11-12; Mum, How BRITAIN Is GoVzERE (1929) at 300 ff.;
Fairlie, Advisory Committees in British Administration (1926) 20 AM. PmL ScL REv.
812; NVuLLis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 36-37; M[cMahon, Boards, AdtIory (1930),
2 ENcYc. Soc..ScrNcs 609.
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More direct participation of groups in administration results from the

presence of group representatives upon official agencies. 170 The delegation
of official power to private groups' 71 carries the evolution to an ultimate
conclusion.1 7 2 The conclusion, however, is one that divorces public officials from the administrative process which formerly they monopolized.
Absent an effective governmental direction of the activity of these private
groups, the ideal of a direct, purified transmission of policy from its
responsible source to its execution is completely lost.' 3
In the United States there is of necessity a greater divorcement than
in England of policy determination from the exercise of continuous
controlling powers over administration. Since the executive occupies a
constitutionally independent position, there is no doctrine of general
administrative responsibility to the legislature." 4 There can be, however,
and of late there has been, a strong Lendency to increase responsibility
of all administrative agencies to a single executive head.y7h That tendency
has now reached the point of attacking the continued existence of the
"independent" commissions, whose exercise of regulatory power over
economic activity has been one of the most pronounced features of the
development of American administration, especially in the Federal system.' 7 6 The recent withdrawal by the Supreme Court of the constitutional
basis for Presidential removal of the members of these commissions" 7
has eliminated the sole means of former executive control over them
except the exercise of the power of appointment to vacancies, after
terms of office which exceed the President's own.
The attack upon the independent commissions for the purpose of
strengthening the executive is reinforced by two other ideas: first, a
170.
171.

Chamberlain, Democratic Control of Administration (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 186.
Comment (1932) 32 COL. L REv. 80, Comment (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 447;

Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups (1937) 51 HAiv. L. Ray. 201.
172. In England, delegation to professional organizations "need occasion no remark",
for "gild-like organizations have supervised trade from time immemorial." CAm, op.
cit. supra note 163, at 9.
173. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
174. See WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1926),

at 24-30, 421-439, for a summary of the actual extent of administrative responsibility
to the legislature in the United States.
175. "In America . . . there has emerged in recent years a pronounced tendency
to enhance the administrative powers of chief executives, including the president, governors, mayors, and managers." White, Administration, Public, 1 ENcYc. Soc. ScIENE s
(1930) at 449. On the strengthening of the Presidency, as a fact and as a desirable
policy, see Hart, The President and Federal Administration in the GOODNOW ESSAYS,

cited supra note 3. See also WITE, op. cit. supra note 174, at cc. v. and vi.
176. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT (1937)
Part I, at 31 ff.
177. Rathbun v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). See Donovan & Irvine
The President's Power to Removi Members of Administrative Agencies (1936) 21
CORN. L. Q. 215.
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belief in the superiority of the single-headed department as an administrative mechanism'1 and second, dissatisfaction with the commingling
of "quasi-judicial" and administrative functions in the same agencies.1 70
It is unnecessary to discuss these reasons separately here, but points
relating to them will appear incidentally.18 0
The President's Committee on Administrative Management uses strong
language in condemning the presence of the "independent" commissions
in the government.'' The meat of the matter appears in the statement
that "there has grown up a headless 'fourth branch' of the government,
responsible to no one, and impossible of coordination with the general
policies and work of the government as determined by the people through
their duly elected representatives."' 8 2 This view is based upon current
political-science conceptualism, which assumes that all policies should
respond to the verdict of the last election. Probably most policies should.
But there is evidence that certain policies should be controlled by somewhat slower processes. Statutory or constitutional tax levies, alterable
only by vote of the people, are the foundations upon which many public
educational enterprises rest, and they do not necessarily cut too deeply
into current budgetary administration. For different reasons, some

governmental economic policies, involving the weighing of interrelated
interestslm and the careful estimation of the effects of governmental
measures and constituting the framework upon which private enterprise
must build, ought to be entrusted to long-time formulation under expert
control. It is not without- significance that lawyer"18 and economist's
unite in sustaining the wisdom of maintaining independent commissions
in the field of economic regulation. How far governmental economic
178. "Boards make screens. If anything goes wrong, you don't kmow vihere to find
the offender; it was the board that did "it,not one of the members; always the board,
the board!" Bentham, quoted from Richard Rush in OGDm, Jnmm Bemunar, 1832(appendix). See also IAsn, GRAuLu or PoLrrxcs (1925) at 370;
MACHINERY oF GovERwsEr ComurrrEE oF Tm Mrnsnay or RrcoNsmucnoz (1918),
2032 (1932)

at 11.
179. AitICAN BAR AssocrATioN, REPORT OF THE SECIA. CoMUnn' oiN AwlurnsTRATIVE LAw (1934) 59 A. B. A. REP. at 540, 544, 551.
180. The effect of mingling administrative and judicial functions (the "prosecutorjudge" combination) has been mentioned supra, n. 142.
181. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 176, at 32.
182. Ibid.
183. Mansfield, The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Consideration of Commercial
i, THE IT==rsrAr
Conditions in Rate Fixing (1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 339; 1 SHAmnn
Comm.RcE CommssioN (1931) 225-235; 3B, id., at 413-463.
184. Robinson, The Hoch-Sinith Resolution and the Future of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1929) 42 HARv. I. R-v. 610; HENzmsoii, Tnz FI nAY TnADu
CommissioN (1924), at 341. See also Eastman, The Place of the Independent Commission (1928) 12 CoxsT. Rxv. 95, at 100.
185. SHA R_.AN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 952-953.
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planning can be extended and stabilized no one can yet say; but there
seems to be no adequate reason for destroying the results that have been
obtained. Congressional alteration of fundamental policy will always
be possible.
The matter of stabilized economic control by independent commissions
must be decided, of course, in regard to each one separately. The report
of Professor Cushman, upon which the recommendations of the President's Committee presumably are based, enumerates some matters that
should be subject to Presidential control and, therefore, to changes of
policy with changing administrations or with successive Presidential
expedients. Among these are the balancing of interests in railroad ratemaking policy and the attitude of the government in the enforcement of
the anti-trust laws.'"6 The proposal requires further study by economists
to ascertain whether the economic system can survive control of the suggested variety.
But the conflict between the President's Committee and the advocates
of independent commissions is not so irreconcilable as it may seem. For
within the departments to which these agencies would be transferred
under the Committee's proposal there are to be autonomous "judicial
sections," to which the deciding of cases would be entrusted after the
administrative section had duly formulated the policies. "The division
of work between the two sections would be relatively simple."'' The
idministrative section, it is said, would only prepare cases as the examiners of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission now do. It does not appear at this point what would become
of the President's control of the policies that in the end decide the cases,
if the judicial sections did the deciding.
It is impossible here to enter upon a detailed critique of the feasibility
of this proposal to segregate the "judicial" from the "administrative"
functions of the independent commissions. Professor Cushman is clear
in his own mind that if the divorce cannot be effected, the independent
commissions should be retained.1"' Perhaps the Committee thinks likewise. In any event, advocates of the contending viewpoints can meet
upon the common ground of ascertaining the practicability of the proposal in the light of agreed objectives. Similar meeting of minds might
be achieved in regard to the Committee's"' and Professor Cushman's 1°°
objection to the mingling of administrative and judicial functions. The
objection is based upon the danger of the "prosecutor-judge" combina186.

REPORT OfFTHE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTE

187. Id., Part I, at 41.
188. Id., Part II, at 219.

189. Id., Part I, at 40.
190. Id., Part II, at 222-223.

(1937) Part II,

at 220-221.
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tion. The reality of the danger and the merits of the alternative plan
are not undiscoverable. No one wants to mow down private interests
ruthlessly on the. one hand or to protect them at all costs on the other,
and the need of administrative powers is everywhere recognized. The
chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Administrative Law is as emphatic as the President's Committee in recognizing the
legitimacy of the people's demand for a distribution of welfare commensurate with the technological state to which we have attained.""
The latter Committee is solicitous of impa. tial administrative adjudication no less than of effective administrative management.
III. THE REALITY OF AGREEMENT WITHIN DEMocRACy
It would be naive to suppose that verbal agreement upon broad objectives in itself constitutes an effective coming together of opposing points
of view with reference to administrative law and administrative organ-

ization. Proponents of strong government and believers in the greatest
.possible opportunity for private interests to employ remedies against
administrative action are apparently in present agreement upon the
absorption of the independent commissions into executive departments
of the Government and upon the need for separating "administrative"
and "quasi-judicial" functions, but in view of the ambiguities which
lurk behind their words, they are all too likely to fly apart. Nor is it
certain, when -adherence to the ideal of distributed welfare is expressed
on the one hand by believers in concentrated executive power and on
the other hand by supporters of simplicity in government, that they
would permit the ideal to prevail over the chosen means of attaining it,
if there should be any incompatibility between the two. But it is something to have the objectives stated, with the explicit rccognition that the
means are subordinate to them, and it is equally encouraging to have it
announced that proposals for specific change are intended for acceptance
only if the feasibility of their execution can be demonstrated.
The Report, of the Committee on Ministers' Powers in England,
despite shortcomings in its conceptual approach, has cleared the atmosphere and left two principal issues for solution: (1) the extent to
which, if at all. legally uncontrolled administrative rule-making powers
should be conferred in legislation and (2) the length to which the courts
should be permitted to go in quashing administrative rules and decisions
191. 'McG --;, THE FEDRAL AIMIN.ISTRATIVE SEaVICE AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES i1937) at 2. The Association's committee has wisely chosen to limit

its studies and recmmendations to matters of procedure, recognizing that it would be
neither po.ssible to stem nor pertinent to the lawyer's function to pass judgment upon
the policy oif increasing resort to administrative control. (1933) 58 A. B. A. RWorr
407; (1934) 59 Id., at 543.
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because of alleged illegality in the administrative procedure which led
to them. In the United States, even in the Federal system taken by
itself, the issues are slightly more complex and their solution lies with
the Supreme Court as well as with Congress; but they have been defined
with striking effect by men who adhere to the democratic ideal.
In the meanwhile, the materials in terms of which the accepted answers
must be. cast are slowly accumulating. Not only are the operations of
particular administrative agencies and types of administrative action
being revealed with thoroughness, but the processes of administrative
effectuation of policy are being analyzed in terms that may lead to pracof the maximum supervisory
tical solutions of such problems as that
1 92
load which a chief executive can bear.
At least in the presence of accepted ultimate purposes, such as those
involved in the democratic thesis, some approach to a scientific choice
of means seems possible.1 9 3 "Within broad limits, governments both
here and abroad are now attempting to manage the whole economic system in the interest of individual security, rather than to supervise a
small section in the interest of free competition."' 9 4 They cannot escape
from the task or from maintaining administrative systems adequate to
its performance. We must learn, as quickly as we may, how to make
popular government at once responsible, capable, and just.D5
192. Involved in this problem are the "span of attention" which is psychologically
possible and the types of "line" and "staff" organization which will add to the possible
"span of control." Gaus, A Theory of Organizationin Public Administration, in GAys,
W HrrE,& Drmocr, op. cit. supra note 161.
193.

White, The Meaning of Principles in Public Administration, in GAus, WHITE &

DimocK, op. cit. supra note 161; Cohen, On Absolutions in Legal Thought (1936)
84 U. op PA. L. REv. 681, at 703, 715.
194. Leonard D. White, quoted in Remington, Purposes of the Institute of Public
Administration (1936) 14 J. PuB. ADmi. 30.
195. Cf. Green, The Administrative Process (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 708.

